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Trade, FDI and Migration.
Fabien Candau (UPPA, CATT)
Abstract
This article provides a theoretical synthesis of the New Economic Geography to analyse
the links between trade, FDI and migrations. We nd that liberalizing from high trade costs,
a country can attract both capital and labour - the bifurcation pattern is a gradual peripheral
exodus of worker associated with capital ight from the periphery - but after a threshold
of trade costs, opening trade generates return migration toward the periphery while capital
remains agglomerated in the core. The model is built on the assumption that factors are
sector specic. By relaxing this assumption and by providing a second model where workers
are mobile between industries (vertically linked) but also between countries we conrm this
result.
JEL classication: F12; R12
Keywords: Economic geography; migration costs; FDI.
1 Introduction
What is Globalization? Ask a rst year student, he will answer that it is the integration of national
economies into the world economy through trade, capital ows, and migration. But surprisingly,
while this term appears repeatedly in all newspapers, it is often analyzed partially through a focus
on only one variable. Even in academic literature, the whole picture is rarely taken. Indeed, there
are few models that analyse simultaneously these three ows and their interconnection.
To illustrate this, consider a particular economy with:
i) symmetry in factor endowments between countries
ii) identical technologies across space
iii) constant returns to scale and perfect competition
Relaxing i), you will have the Heckscher (1918), Ohlin (1933) and Mundell (1957) model which
predicts that capital and labor should move in opposite directions: capital scarce countries should
attract capital, while labor scarce countries should attract labor. In analyzing facts, such a result
is debatable. For instance, the United States has attracted a high share of the world capital during
the past decades but also a signicant part of the world workers. Such a result does not belong
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exclusively to this second global century. Economists interested in the age of mass migration before
19141 clearly indicate that the United States absorbed capital and labor and ve European nations
sent out both (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK).
The theoretical substitutability between factors is also found between trade and international
factor movements. Capital ows or migrations by reducing endowment di¤erences eliminate the
trade cause in standard models. A result which seems dubious in an era of high nancial integration
and signicant trade exchanges.
By relaxing i) and ii) one obtains the HOS model with Ricardian features of Kemp (1966),
Jones (1967) and Purvis (1972). Purvis (1972) in particular shows that the introduction of capital
mobility into a free trade framework can increase the volume of trade. Thus, factors mobility and
trade are substitutes when technologies di¤er. Lastly, in three di¤erent models, Markusen (1983)
relaxes successively ii) and iii) by adding technological advantages, external economies of scale and
monopoly, which allows him to conclude that the substitutability between "trade in goods and
factors is in fact a rather special result which is a general characteristic only of factor proportions
models". But with Neary (1995) one can consider that these separated models do not give a
simple general equilibrium model of trade and factor mobility.2 Building on a two-country version
of the specic-factors model of Jones (1971) with international capital ows, this author shows
that the complementarity found by Markusen depends on the assumption that capital is used in
the exporting sector.
In the New Economic Geography which relaxes iii), the disconnection between the location
choice of workers and capital, at least on the theoretical ground, is striking: Martin and Rogers
(1995) and Robert-Nicoud (2006) have built a model on footloose capital where labour is immobile
while Krugman (1991)3 focuses on the mobility of labour. A comparison of the two models has
been brilliantly done in Baldwin et al. (2003) but no bridge has been built until now between these
models.4 We propose to ll this gap by merging them, which allows analysing the complementarity
between capital ows, migration and trade through pecuniary externalities.
In the current model, migration leads to expenditure shifting because workers spend their
incomes locally and expenditure shifting leads to production shifting because rms earn more by
relocating their activities near the demand. Moreover a circular causality is also generated by
this relocation because more production in one country implies a fall of imported goods and thus
reduces the cost of living. If we now introduce capital, this circular causality may be reinforced
1See for instance Hatton and Willamson (2006).
2More precisely Neary (1995) writes "International factor movements are a pervasive and integral part of the
world economy. Yet the study of such factor movements remains peripheral in courses and textbooks on international
trade theory. Many models of the process exist of course, but they are generally presented as ancillary rather than
central to the theory. In part, this is because there is no simple general equilibrium model in which determinate
levels of international trade and international factor mobility coexist".
3See also Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and Puger (2004)
4The sole exception is Borck, Püger and Wrede (2007). However the model di¤ers in many points.
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because agglomeration of capital implies a decrease in prices of goods that are produced with this
factor under increasing returns. Ceteris paribus this raise the real wage where agglomeration occurs
which attracts more migrants. But this circular causality can be broken by urban costs. Indeed,
following recent empirical researches showing that immigration clearly impacts on house prices at
least in small countries5 , we integrate land rent and commuting costs. These urban features imply a
dispersion of individuals only when trade is free enough while capital does not follow this dispersion
and remains agglomerated. Agglomeration of one factor leads to the agglomeration of the other,
but dispersion of one factor is not necessary su¢ cient to foster a dispersion of the second one. Our
model thus mainly focuses on small countries, but it is important to notice that our denition of a
small country di¤ers strongly from the one retained in international trade. Indeed we consider as a
small country, a country that has land constraint. Thus this denition includes countries with high
GDP such as Japan. Concerning this country the link between trade, migration of entrepreneurs
and urban costs, as it is described in our model, is illustrated in Fujita et al. (2004) who consider
that on account of higher wages and land prices in the three largest metropolitan areas (Tokyo,
Osaka, Nagoya), the growth rate of net migration has been a¤ected. In particular authors have
pointed out:
"Given the high valued yen and the high wage rate in Japan together with the succes-
sive reduction in transport costs, many large manufacturing rms successively moved
an increasing share of their labor-intensive operations to the low-wage countries (in par-
ticular, those in East Asia). [...] The continued growth of Tokyo, meanwhile, fuelled
the ever rising land-prices there since the mid 1970s, which soon spread to other major
cities in Japan. Such an accelerating increase in land prices ended up creating huge
bubbles in land markets in Japan by the late 1980s, which busted in the early 1990s.
This burst of land markets (together with stock markets) destroyed the foundations of
the traditional nancial system of Japan, resulting in the prolonged recession since the
early 1990s [which] quickly curtailed the net migration to the Tokyo MA, resulting in
a negative rate of net migration to the Tokyo MA in 1994 which happened for the rst
time since 1955."
We do not model such a complex story, but try to capture the basic idea that migration can
destroy itseft by rising land-prices.
This model is obviously based on specic assumptions concerning agglomerative and dispersive
forces. In order to see whether it produces pecular results in reason of pecular assumptions, we
propose a second model with di¤erent assumptions.
5Degen and Fischer (2009) shows that the impact of immigration on house prices represents almost two thirds
of the total price increase in Switzerland. Saiz (2007) nds that when the inow of migrants represents 1% of a
citys population then there is an increase in house prices by 2% in U.S. cities (see also Gonzalez and Ortega (2009)
concerning the Spanish market who nd similar results).
3
Indeed, urban features are removed and Ethiers (1982) formulation of international economics
is adopted by working with vertical linkages between rms which are mobile at the global level6 .
Moreover in this model, workers are also mobile between countries and between sectors.7 This
generates new forces but similar results: trade liberalization leads to an agglomeration of rms
and workers in a rst stage, but in a second one while rms stay agglomerated, workers choose to
leave the core for the periphery.
The choice to present two di¤erent models is not unique in the literature.8 We obviously also
emphasize the main di¤erences between these models, and this may be interesting for empirical
analysis9 on FDI, trade and migration where urban costs are rarely integrated.
2 Footloose capital and entrepreneurs in the City
Consider an economy with two regions (labelled r = 1; 2) and three sectors, two monopolistic
sectors (labelled k = A;B) that produce di¤erentiated products under increasing returns to scale
using skilled and unskilled workers (h) in sector A and capital (K) in sector B ; and a constant
return to scale sector (labelled C) that produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition.
Each region is formed by a city spread along a one-dimensional space X. The amount of land
available at each location x 2 X is equal to one. Skilled workers (also called entrepreneurs in the
literature) are mobile from one city to the next but also inside each city. More precisely skilled
workers who own one unit of land are spread along a line, and because their business is located
in the middle of this line (called the Central Business District (CBD)), they need to commute.
Indeed all rms located in region r set up a headquarters at the CBD situated at the origin x = 0
of X. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the unskilled live at the suburb where the land rent
is null and do not need to commute to work. Capital owners also live at the periphery of cities
and are immobile from one region to the other. Capital freely moves to the region with the highest
6More precisely we work on the Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) which is a simplication of the Krugman
and Venables (1995) model.
7We integrate the probabilistic migration of Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Murata (2003) and Russek (2010), that
stresses taste heterogeneity in residential location in the vertical linkages model.
8For instance Helpman (1998) proposes a model with product di¤erenciation à la Dixit-Stiglitz and another one
with homogeneous goods and external economies of scale. From these two di¤erent models, similars results are
obtained, trade liberalization fosters dispersion in a presence of a given amount of housing which allows the author
to conclude that there is nothing peculiar in his result.
9Several theoretical models are also used to check the robustness of results and to analyse the main determinants
of bilateral trade in the literature on gravity equations. For instance Evenett and Keller (2002) distinguish four kinds
of 2x2x2 models 1) Increasing Returns Sectors (IRS) with perfect specialization between countries 2) a Heckscher-
Ohlin-based perfect specialization model called HO multicone 3) an IRS model incorporating imperfect specialization
model, called IRS/HO unicone 4) an HO-based imperfect specialization, namely unicone HO model. In the same
spirit, Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001) propose to derive gravity equations from models with increasing returns
and di¤erenciation and then with homogeneous goods and segmentation (reciproqual dumping models). See Candau
and Dienesch (2011) for a survey on the various theoretical foundations of similar gravity equations.
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nominal reward. Nominal rewards of capitalist and entrepreneurs are denoted !kr with k = A;B
and r = 1; 2 and each skilled worker owns an equal share of the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR) where
he resides. The standard micro-foundations of this urban framework concerning skilled workers
can be found in Alonso (1964) and Fujita (1989)10 and can be described as follows.
Commuting costs have a direct impact on the labour force of skilled workers. Each skilled
consumes one unit of land, supplies one unit of labor, and commutes to the CBD. Hence, in
equilibrium, skilled are equally distributed around the CBD of region r whose urban landscape is
therefore given by [ hr=2; hr=2] with hr the number of skilled workers in region r. Commuting
costs have an iceberg form, thus implying that the e¤ective labor supply by a skilled worker living
at a distance j x j from the CBD is given by:
s(x) = 1  2 j x j with x 2 [ hr=2; hr=2] (1)
where  (with  < 1) is skilled workercommuting cost, j x j measures distance to CBD. Indeed as
the number of skilled in one city is hr, the maximal distance from the CBD is hr2 , thus the total
labour supply net of commuting cost in one city is equal to :
Sr =
hr=2Z
 hr=2
s(x)dx = hr(1  hr=2): (2)
As land rent at both edges of the segment is normalized to zero, if !Ar is the wage of skilled near
the CBD, then wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges is11 :
s(hr=2)!
A
r = s( hr=2)!Ar = (1  hr)!Ar : (3)
Because consumers are identical in terms of preferences and income, at equilibrium they must reach
the same utility level. Thus skilled workers who live on the fringe of the segment only receive a
net wage of (1   hr)!Ar but pay no land rent. On the contrary, workers who live near the CBD
do not pay signicant commuting costs, but the price of the services yielded by land is higher in
this location. Thus, the increase in nominal wage near central places o¤sets land rent. Figure 1
depicts this situation.
10See among others Krugman and Livas (1996), Murata and Thisse (2005), Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2008)
and Candau (2008, 2009) who also use this framework in di¤erent models.
11We can notice that when an entrepreneur moves from one city to the other then the line segment becomes longer
because a new unit of land is added at the extremity of the city (each entrepreneurs owns one unit of land). By
assumption however the CBD is still in the middle of the segment. Then one can imagine that the CBD change
along this line to locate it in the middle again. All these assumptions are standard and identical to Murata and
Thisse [2005] and Krugman and Livas [1996]. Obviously we can notice with Krugman and Livas that "ideally the
need for a central business district would itself be derived from the model, but this is left for later research".
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Figure 1: Land rent
In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the net wage in the city, while the horizontal axis shows
the size of this city. Because each entrepreneur owns one land unit, this size only depends on their
number. As Figure 1 shows a move from the suburb to the CBD implies a decrease in commuting
and therefore an increase in net wage, but also an equivalent increase in land rent which equalizes
utility among individuals.
In other terms, the following condition must be veried:
s(x)!Ar  Rr(x) = (1  hr)!Ar ;
where s(x) is the total amount supplied by a skilled worker who lives on the fringe of the CBD,
Rr(x) is the land rent prevailing at x in region r, while the right-hand side represents the wage
net of commuting costs earned at both edges given by (3). By inserting expression (1) into this
system we nd the following land rent:
Rr(x) = (hr   2 j x j)!Ar with x 2 [ hr=2; hr=2]:
From this equation we can nd the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR):
ALRr =
hr=2Z
 hr=2
Rr(x)dx =
h2r!
A
r
2
:
While on the one hand, Tabuchi [1998] assumes that there are absentee landlords, and on the
other, Helpman [1998] assumes that the aggregate land rent is owned at the global level, here it
is considered with Murata and Thisse [2005] that each skilled worker owns an equal share of the
ALR where they reside. Thus their non salaried income is:
ALRr
hr
=
hr!
A
r
2
: (4)
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Each households preferences take the Dixit (1990) form introduced by Püger (2004) in the NEG
literature:
Ur = a lnC
A
r + (1  a) lnCBr + CC ;
where Ckr =
264 Z
i2nkr
mkrr(i)
 1
 di+
Z
i2nks
mkrs(i)
 1
 di
375

 1
with k = A;B and r; s = 1; 2 with r 6= s
where Ckr is the consumption of a k manufactures aggregate, n
k
r is the set of k varieties produced in
region r and nks varieties k produced in region s (r; s = 1; 2 ),  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among these varieties. mkrr represents consumption of particular variety produced and consummed
locally in country r, while mkrs represents the consumption in r of a variety produced in s. C
C is
the consumption of an homogeneous good which is produced under constant return to scale using
unskilled workers.
Varieties are exchanged between regions under transaction costs which take the form of iceberg
costs:  > 1 units of the variety must be sent from the origin for one unit to arrive at destination.
In contrast there are no trade costs within a region and varieties A and B are traded at the same
cost.
Then the solution to the utility maximization problem generates the following demands in r
for a typical variety produced respectively in location r and s:
mArr(i) = a
Yr
(PAr )
1  p
A
r (i)
 ; mBrr(i) = (1  a)
Yr
(PBr )
1  p
B
r (i)
  (5)
mArs(i) = a
Yr
(PAr )
1  ps(i)
  ; mBrs(i) = (1  a)
Yr
(PBr )
1  p
B
s (i)
  
with P kr the price index in r for k varieties:
P kr =
264 Z
i2nkr
pkr (i)
1 di+
Z
i2nks
pks(i)
1 1 di
375
1
1 
; (6)
2.1 Supply
2.1.1 Sector C
Perfect competition ensures that the traditional good is priced at its marginal cost. Moreover this
good is chosen as the numéraire, and since it is traded costlessly, the nominal wage rate is unity
in country 1 and 2. Moreover unskilled workers are equally spread between regions 1 and 2, thus:
L = L = Lw=2 (7)
where Lw is the world population of unskilled normalized to one.
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2.1.2 Sector A and B
The sole di¤erence between sector A and B is that factors of production di¤er. For sake of simplicity
everything else is identical. In particular concerning the cost function, the production of a typical
variety of manufactured goods involves  units of capital and skilled services as a xed cost in the
sector A and B respectively. The variable cost requires  units of unskilled workers in A and B.
But as unskilled are located outside the city, it is assumed that production is being conducted in
suburban areas which raises the marginal cost by a factor '. In other words the rm is spatially
fragmented with headquarter in the CBD and plants at the periphery. Thus ' can be understood
as communication or transport costs between unskilled that perform routine tasks at the periphery
and skilled workers or capital that are used to perform service tasks in the CBD (nancial tasks
for instance). Such a cost function, which is in essence an assumption of convenience, turns out
to be justiable on empirical grounds. Moreover a similar modelling has been used by Fujita and
Thisse (2006) with rms fragmented at the international level12 . Thus the total cost of producing
ykr (i) units of a typical manufactured variety is:
TCkr (i) = !
k
r + 'y
k
r (i); (8)
Such a cost function is widely used in the literature (see for instance Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)),
which also assumes that  = 1 and  =  1 . Workers are qualied of skilled since they enter in
the xed cost of production. In the spirit of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), they are necessary to
the rm in order to develop a new idea that gives its characteristics to the variety.
Thus each rm is a monopolist in the production of its variety and maximizes its prot with:
ykr (i) = m
k
rr(i) + m
k
sr(i) (9)
According to the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, a typical rm sets the following price:
pkr (i) = '=(   1) = ' (10)
With the input-output coe¢ cient equals to the reverse of the mark-up, prices are equal to one
where the variety is produced and to ' when the variety is imported.
Under free entry, prots are always equal to zero, which, using (8) and (10), gives the level of
output:
ykr (i) =

'
!kr : (11)
In equilibrium, a typical rm employs one unit of factor, so that the total demand is n. As skilled
labour supply is exactly S, and capital supply is K, the equalization gives the number of varieties
12See also Robert-Nicoud (2008) and for a brillant review of the implication of the increase in international
o¤shoring see Baldwin (2006).
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produced in each sector:
nAr = Sr (12)
nBr = Kr: (13)
The number of varieties B in one region is thus identical to the quantity of capital while the
number of varieties produced by the sector A is proportional to the number of skilled workers.
One can prove that: The more symmetric the spatial distribution of skilled workers, the larger
the total mass of varieties A in the economy. Indeed by inserting S1 given by (2) in (12) and
by di¤erentiating the total mass of varieties with respect to h1 (the sum of the population is
normalized to one: h1 + h2 = 1), we get @(nA1 + n
A
2 )=@h1 = @(S1 + S2)=@h1 = (1   2h1) and
@2(nA1 + n
A
2 )=@h
2
1 = @
2(S1 + S2)=@h
2
1 =  2 < 0. Thus, the number of varieties is maximized at
h1 = 1=2 and declines as h1 increases. This corresponds to Proposition 1 of Murata and Thisse
(2005) who clearly states the intuition behind this result:
"Intuitively, when the economy is dispersed, commuting costs are lower, thus imply-
ing that more labor is available for the industrial sector. The fact that the total mass of
varieties varies with the spatial distribution of workers makes our model more general
than the existing ones in which the total number of varieties is constant regardless of
the spatial distribution of rms. More precisely, Proposition 1 shows that agglomeration
generates two types of costs for the workers: higher urban costs as well as a narrower
range of varieties."
With Murata and Thisse (2005) it is worth stressing that there is no technological spillovers
here. This may be an simple extension of our work because capital is already integrated.
2.1.3 Market clearing
By equalizing the total demand of varieties addressed to a northern rm to its supply we get13 :
!k1 = 
'


S1 + L1
nk1 + n
k
2
+ 
S2 + L2
nk1 + n
k
2

(14)
!k2 = 
'



S1 + L1
nk1 + n
k
2
+
S2 + L2
nk1 + n
k
2

(15)
with  = a for k = A (16)
and  = 1  a for k = B (17)
Migration to region 1 (h1 ") increases nominal reward there and decrease it in region 2. Thats
the market access e¤ect. Its evolution is worth stressing:
13Similar expressions have been obtained in the literature. In sector A equations (14) and (15) are similar to those
obtained in the quasi-linear FE model of Püger (2003). In sector B, similar equations have been used in Püger
(2001) to analyse ecological dumping.
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Proposition 1 Migration plays positively on the market access but this positive e¤ect decreases
with trade liberalization and with urban costs.
Proof. By considering that price indexes are constant, one obtains: @!
k
1
@h1
= '
h
1 h1
Pk1
+  (1 h1) 1
Pk2
i
.
Then by starting from a symmetric case where P k1 = P
k
2 one can verify that sign(
@!k1
@h1

h1=1=2
) =
sign(1    +22 ) and because 1    +22 > 0 if  < 2 which is veried by denition, one
can conclude that @!
k
1
@h1

h1=1=2
> 0. Moreover sign(
@!k1
@h1

h1=1=2
@ ) = sign(
 2
2 ) < 0;8 < 1 and
sign(
@!k1
@h1

h1=1=2
@ ) = sign(  1 2 ) < 0.
One can notice that FDI (K1 ") does not impact on this e¤ect.14
In opposition to this agglomerative force, more rms in region 1 (nk1 ") foster competition and
reduce nominal reward (if  < 1). Thats the market crowding e¤ect.
In the long run factors are mobile, capital and skilled workers move towards the nation with
the highest rewards. A standard assumption is to consider that capital owners are immobile
internationally and that rents from capital earned abroad are repatriated. Thus by denoting 
B
the di¤erential rewards:

B = !B1   !B2
there is a stable total agglomeration in region 1 if 
B

K1=1
 0, a stable agglomeration of capital
in region 2 if 
B

K1=0
 1 and a stable dispersed equilibrium if d
BdK1

K1=1=2
< 0.
Concerning skilled workers, in the long run, they are mobile between countries and migrate
towards the nation with the highest indirect utility. Utility maximization yields the indirect utility
function V H1 in region 1 and V
H
2 in region 2 which allows to get the following indirect utility
di¤erential 
A = V H1   V H2 :

A = a(1  ) ln(PA2 =PA1 ) + (1  a)(1  ) ln(PB2 =PB1 ) + (Y1   Y2) (18)
with Yr = (1  
2
hr)!
A
r with r = 1; 2 (19)
where (1  2hr)!Ar comes from the income of land ownership (hr!Ar =2) and from the wage net of
commuting costs earned at both edges ((1  hr)!Ar ).
In this equation of migration two additional forces appear : on the one hand the term (1 hr=2),
creates a dispersive force independently of trade costs, which is the land market-crowding e¤ect.
On the other hand the third term P k2 =P
k
1 is an agglomerative force, indeed goods are cheaper in
the agglomerated area because imports are lower and thus the burden of trade costs too. This last
force is the supplier market access. Lets analyse its change with respect to trade costs.
Proposition 2 Migration and capital entry play positively on the supplier access but this positive
e¤ect decreases with trade liberalization.
14Baldwin et al. (2004, sect 16.2 p.394) also use this quasi linear footloose capital to study tax competition.
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Proof. In sector A relative price index are given by h1+(1 h1)h1+(1 h1) , thus
@(
h1+(1 h1)
h1+(1 h1) )
@h1
= (1 )(1+)
[h1+(1 h1)]2 >
0 and then
@(
(1 )(1+)
[h1+(1 h1)]2
)
@ =
 2[h1+(1 h1)]2 
+z }| {
@([h1 + (1  h1)]2)
@
[h1+(1 h1)]4 < 0. The same results are ob-
tained in the B sector by replacing h1 by k1 in price indices.
A new circular causality comes from the pecuniary externalities between sector A and B. Indeed
contrary to the symmetric FC model where neither demand-linked nor cost-linked circular causality
is generated (see Baldwin et al. 2003, p.82), here from (14 with k = B) it is clear that more skilled
workers in region 1 generate more outlets and prots in sector B and thus attract capital. This
new entry of capital reduces the price index in sector B which (according to (18)) increases the
attractiveness of region 1 for skilled workers. This new migration can in turn attract capital and
so on.
2.2 Location choice
The relationship between migration and capital ow in sector B is obtained by solving 
A = 0
with respect to K1 and gives:
K1 =
L( 1 + )  (   2)+ 2h1( 1 + (   1)) + h21(1  )
[2 + 2L+ (2h1   1  2h21)] (  1)
(20)
Lets rst observe that the location of capital equalizing capital rents internationally is strictly
increasing in h1 from autarky to free trade. This means that migration always attracts capital.
Figure 2.b and 2.c represents such a result by plotting equation (20), i.e the location of capital K1,
as a function of skilled workers h1 for two di¤erent level of trade openning.
Such a result comes from the fact that migration induces a spatial expenditure shifting (market
access e¤ect) for rms operating in sector B.
Thus if h1 = 1=2 dispersion is always a stable equilibrium regardless of the value of trade costs,
but if h1 > 1=2 then partial agglomeration occurs in sector B. This partial agglomeration ends up
by a total agglomeration of capital if K1 = 0. Thus by solving (20) with such a value one obtains
the level of trade costs at which a total agglomeration of capital in region 1 occurs:
K =
3  2h1(1  )  (1 + h21)
2h1 + 1  h21
(21)
Such an expression is very useful since it allows using equation (20) for all trade levels between
autarky and K (which satises 
B

K1=1
= 0) and K1 = 1 for all levels of trade costs between
K and free trade.
Thus, by using the share of capital as a function of skilled workers (equation (20)) in nominal
wages ((14) and (15) with k = A) and by inserting these expressions in the location choice of
entrepreneurs (equation (18)) one can analyse how migration evolves according to trade liberal-
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ization. By this mean, numerical simulation in Figure 2.a and 2.c are obtained.15 The horizontal
axis represents the share of skilled workers in region 1 and the vertical axis 
A.
Figure 2
For high trade costs ( = 0:3) dispersion of skilled workers (h1 = 1=2) is stable which ensures,
as we have just pointed out, that dispersion of capital is also a stable equilibrium. Figure 2.b
represents such a result by plotting the location of capital (20) as a function of skilled workers h1.
When trade is liberalized, agglomeration of entrepreneurs (Figure 2.c) and capital (Figure 2.d)
occurs gradually and one can observe that the agglomeration of capital emerges sooner than that
of skilled workers16 . Indeed in Figure 2.c when 80% of skilled workers are agglomerated in region
117 (for  = 0:463), this region already hosts 90% of FDI.
When trade is liberalized even more, a total agglomeration of capital occurs, nominal rewards
in sector B are higher in region 1 than in region 2 (
B > 0). The literature speaks about an
agglomeration rent to illustrate this situation. More liberalization yields a total agglomeration of
skilled workers but for lower trade costs the land market crowding e¤ect dominates agglomeration
forces, the costs of living in the big cities being too high for skilled workers who come back in their
region of origin.
The diagram below sums up these results by plotting the location of capital and entrepreneurs
with respect to trade freeness. It illustrates that agglomeration of capital occurs gradually and
stays stable until free trade while agglomeration of entrepreneurs only occurs for intermediate level
of trade costs. This result obviously comes from urban costs, without them agglomeration of both
15Parameters:  = 1:1;  = 0:1; a = 0:9
16We have done numerous simulations to check this result, and it seems surprisingly robust. Indeed K1 given
by (20) and plotted for instance in Figure 2.d is above the 45 line which explains why agglomeration of capital
occurs sooner. For higher commuting costs, the relationship between capital and workers is below the 45 line
indicating that total agglomeration of entrepreneurs may occur sooner than that of capital. But for these high levels
of commuting costs, dispersion of entrepreneurs is the sole stable equilibrium.
17We focus here on cases where agglomeration occurs in region 1. But in reason of multiple equilibria agglomeration
in region 2 is also an equilibrium and thus a similar reasonning can be done by considering this polar case.
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factors are stable even for low trade costs. This reveals the importance of these costs around free
trade.
Figure 3
To conclude, we retain the following result: agglomeration of capital attracts skilled workers, while
dispersion of skilled workers does not generate a dispersion of capital. In other words, agglomera-
tion of skilled workers and capital is a virtuous circle for the region that hosts these factors, while
dispersion of skilled is not a vicious circle for FDI which still benets of an agglomeration rent
when trade is liberalized.
These results need however to be conrmed. Indeed, our model is clearly specic, perhaps the
most critical assumption concerns the sector specic factor we use. This assumption has been
presented by Caves (1971), who considered that capital can be a composite factor that is more
mobile between two identical sectors of di¤erent countries than between two di¤erent sectors of the
same region. One believes that such a relationship can also be applied to highly skilled workers,
but that limits the generality of our analysis. Moreover the empirical ndings of the domestic
versus international capital mobility do not fully support the capital sector specic assumption18
and lastly one wants to introduce other agglomeration forces such as vertical linkages between rms
and other dispersive forces such as migration costs (attachment to home, costs of moving etc) to
test the robustness of our result.
3 Location of unskilled workers and of rms with vertical
linkages
The model is based on Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006), ORN hereafter. The economy is
composed of two regions, two sectors (superscript B and C) and one factor of production, labour
(L). This factor is freely mobile between sectors, thus we relax the factor specic sector assumption
previously made. Moreover this factor is mobile across countries, but incurs migration costs which
18See for instance Reitzes and Roussland (1988).
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vary from one worker to another. These are monetary costs (such as travel costs or the costs of
moving out etc) and/or psychological costs (such as attachment to home etc).
Regions are labelled as previously with a subscript r = 1; 2. The utility function for a typical
individual in r takes a Dixit-Stiglitz form. More precisely the upper tier utility is a Cobb-Douglas
function, the individual spends a share  of income Yr on the composite manufacturing good CB
and a share 1  on the homogenous good CC . The industrial good is a composite of nw varieties
(w for world) captured by a constant elasticity of substitution  > 1 between any pair of varieties
k. The dual of this, the indirect utility function is given by:
Vr =
Yr
Pr
(22)
Pr =
R nw
i=0
p(k)1 dk
1=(1 )
(23)
where Pr is the price index in the region r.
As in the previous model the homogeneous good CC is produced under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale whereas the industrial sector produces di¤erent varieties under increasing
returns to scale. Firms evolve in a monopolistic competition framework in the wake of Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) and Ethier (1982), which means that the di¤erent varieties that consumers buy are also
used as an input (in addition to labour) into the production of each variety. This well-known tricky
assumption allows presenting input-output linkages without introducing two sorts of industries.19
Labour and composite input enter in the variable cost and xed cost via a Cobb-Douglas function,
more precisely the following total cost is considered:
TCr(i) = !
1 
r P

r + !
1 
r P

r yr(i)
with  and  the elasticities of substitution between the inputs in xed and variable costs and !
the workersnominal wage. From this equation, we assume that  = 0; thus the xed costs only
depend on industrial goods while the variable costs are only a function of labour. Such a cost
function is in the spirit of Flam and Helpman (1987) who also assume that di¤erent inputs impact
di¤erently on xed and variable costs. Since the price of the homogenous good is taken as the
numéraire, under perfect competition and without trade costs we get: !r = 1 and this gives:
TCr(i) = P

r + yr(i)
ORN make an additional simplication by assuming that the technology to produce industrial
varieties use intermediate inputs in the same proportion that consumers spend their incomes:
 = .
By maximizing its pure prot (denoted  while operating prot are denoted  such as in region
r: r = r   Pr with r = (pr   )y), a typical rm in region r sets the following price:
pr(i) =

   1 (24)
19See Venables (1996) for a more complete modelling where the same industry is not as here both downstream
and upstream.
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Thus, when inserting this price in (23) one can observe that, at the di¤erence with Puga (1998),
there is no recursivity in the denition of the price index, which makes the present model much
more tractable than the original one. With this price, prot in r is:
r =

   1y(i)  P

r (25)
which gives under free entry and exit:
P r =

   1y(i) (26)
Trade in industrial goods occurs under the assumption of iceberg trade costs:  units must be
shipped for one unit to arrive in the other region. The delivered price ps of a variety produced in
r is pr which gives ps = 

 1 . These trade costs can be interpreted as a package of transaction
costs, tari¤ and non tari¤ costs, transport costs and time costs. To simplify notation, it is assumed
with the literature that  is equal to the reverse of the mark up (i.e  =  1 ). This simplies price
to unity when goods are sold locally and to  when they are sold abroad. From this and (23), the
northern price index is:
P1 = (n1 + n2)
1
1  (27)
where  = 1  ( 2 [0; 1]) is a measure of trade openness. For instance, with  = 0 countries are
in autarky while  = 1 is a situation of free trade.
By using the Shephards lemma for the total cost, the Roy identity on the indirect utility, the
market clearing condition is obtained and given in region 1 by:
y1 = 

L1 + n11
w1(n1 + n2)
+ 
L2 + n22
w2(n1 + n2)

(28)
with
1 =
y1

(29)
From this equation (and its twin) in the South one obtains y1 (and y2):
y1 =
(L1(n1 + n2) + L2(n1 + n2)+ 
 1L1n2(2   1))
 1 [n2(n1 + n2) + n1(n1 + n2)] + 2 2n1n2(2   1)  (n1 + n2)(n1 + n2)
(30)
Two forces drives the level of output in one region, the supplier access e¤ect (via price index)
and the market crowding e¤ect. The former is an agglomerative force, rms like to locate close
to their customers as this decreases their shipping costs. Thus relocations of rms in the region
with the higher market potential entails a growth of production in this location. The latter is a
dispersive force, rms do not like to locate close to their competitors as this reduces their output
prices and bid up input prices.
In the long run, rms choose the location of production according to pure prots. With Ot-
taviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) it is assumed that each new rms are created (closed) in each
region as long as prots are positive (negative) or as long as r
Pr
is larger than unity (which is
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equivalent indeed 1 = 1   P 1 = 0 , rPr = 1 thus rm enter if
r
Pr
> 1). This term is
labelled qr (in reference to the q-ratio of Tobin):
qr  r
P r
(31)
More precisely, it is assumed that rms enter and exit by a laws of motion such as
:
nr = nr(qr   1)
which can be rewritten by using the share of rms located in one region (s1 = n1n1+n2 the share in
region 1, and nw the number of rm in the world such as nw = n1 + n2):
:
s1 = s1(1  s1)(q1   q2); :nw = nw(s1q1 + (1  s1)q2   1) (32)
the rst equation indicates that rms are created in region 1 as long as production is more protable
there and the second equation shows that the total number of rms increase as long as prots are
positive.
However and as we have seen the location of rms depends partially on the location of workers.
Unskilled workers incur mobility costs which di¤er between individuals, these migration costs
takes the form used by Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). With V L1 the indirect utility in 1, the probability
that a worker will choose to reside in 2 is given by:
Q1 =
exp[V L1 =]
exp[V L1 =] + exp[V
L
2 =]
(33)
where  represents migration costs. The law of motion follows Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and
Russek (2008):
dL1
dt
= (1  L1
L
)Q1   L1
L
Q2
A spatial equilibrium arises when dL1dt = 0.
dL1
dt = 0 gives (1 L1) exp[V
L
1 =]
exp[V L1 =]+exp[V
L
2 =]
= L1
exp[V L2 =]
exp[V L1 =]+exp[V
L
2 =]
and by using the logarithm on the RHS and LHS, one gets : 
C    log L1=L1 L1=L = 0, where

C represents workers indirect utility di¤erential that drives migration (
C = V L1   V L2 =
1
(s1+s2)
=1    1(s1+s2)=1  ). Thus 

C    log L1=L1 L1=L = 0 gives:
L1 =
L
1 + exp( 
C=) (34)
By inserting (34) in (30) and by using (29), (31) one can compute q1 q2 which allows to analysing
the location of rms (see (32)). In Figure a, b and c, we plot q1  q2 with respect to s1 for di¤erent
values of trade costs  and migration costs . One can see that trade liberalization leads to a
progressive agglomeration of rms. Indeed in Figure a, the market crowding e¤ect is the strongest
force, relocation in region 1 generates a slump of prots which become negative there and positive
in region 2. Thus dispersion remains stable. But for a smaller level of trade costs, it becomes
protable for rms to relocate. Around 80% of rms choose the region 1 (or 2 according to multiple
equilibria) in Figure b. For even smaller trade costs the agglomeration becomes progressively total
in Figure c. In these two cases, the cluster of rms allows decreasing the shipping costs between
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upstream and downstream rms and moreover the local spending of new entrepreneurs increases
the demand in region 1. Then, these two agglomerative forces overcome the market crowding
e¤ect.20
Figure 4
In Figure a, band c, we also plot L1 with respect to s1 by using (34). One can see that the
agglomeration of rms is linked to workersagglomeration. However, the total agglomeration of
rms occurs for a lower level of trade liberalization than workersagglomeration. Indeed in Figure
c, all rms are agglomerated in region 1 (or in region 2 according to multiple equilibria), while this
country attracts less than 80% of workers. When all rms are agglomerated, the di¤erential of real
wage is simplied by 
C = 1  = 1. Thus, because  > 1, more trade liberalization decreases
the relative welfare in the region 1 
C , which leads to a dispersion of workers (see (34)). The
diagram below sums up these results by plotting the location of rms and workers with respect to
trade freeness.
Figure 5
Figure 5 illustrates that agglomeration of rms occurs gradually and stays stable until free trade,
while a partial agglomeration of workers occurs only for intermediate levels of trade costs. To check
the robustness of this result we have run numerous simulations and we have found the same trend
with however one di¤erence: the bifurcation diagram can be di¤erent according to migration costs.
20Parameters:  = 2; a = 1;  =  = 0:4;  = 0:55; L = 1:
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Indeed with higher migration trade liberalization generate a sudden and catastrophic agglomeration
instead of the progressive process obtained here.
To conclude this theoretical section, we retain the main result of the two models:
Proposition 3 By liberalizing trade from high trade costs, a country can attract both capital and
labour - the bifurcation pattern is a gradual peripheral exodus of workers associated with capital
ight from the periphery - but after a threshold of trade costs, opening trade generates return
migration toward the periphery while capital remains agglomerated in the core.
4 Concluding remarks
The literature on FDI and migration is now burgeoning, but the lack of theoretical foundation and
the absence of one facet of globalization - trade - is problematic in term of static comparative and
in terms of omitted variables. We have shown theoretically that the relationship between FDI and
migration depends heavily on trade costs because these costs impact on the supply (cost linkage) as
well as on the demand (demand linkage). We have also emphasized the importance of urban costs.
The need to build market access and supplier access on trade data (à la Redding and Venables
(2004)) and to take a closer look on urban costs are certainly promising road of research.
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